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Making Pierre Menard Author of the Quixote: 
Critics, Creators, and Context in Borges 
 
 Though it has not always been so, it is now possible to conceptualize the 
act of reading as a process in which we necessarily form an interpretation of a 
piece of literature, and in so doing, create the work, or the meaning of a piece of 
literature—meaning which is intrinsically tied to both the linguistic event of the 
work, or its text, and the context out of which our reading has come. For this 
model, critical theory is greatly indebted to the work of Jorge Luis Borges. The 
title character of Borges's "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote," a minor 
French Symbolist whose “visible works” can be “easily enumerated,” undertakes a 
project which fundamentally questions the relation not only of a literary work to 
its text, but—perhaps more importantly—investigates the processes through 
which a work comes to be and who may lay claim to it. Though in the end, 
Menard's project is unfinished, invisible, and, we are informed, impossible, it is 
nonetheless, from an intellectual point of view, an ambitious scandal:  attempting 
to write the Quixote, a text which has already been written and has, as a context, 
itself. Menard does not seek to rewrite or duplicate the Quixote, nor to translate 
it, but to actually produce the Quixote, linguistically identical to Cervantes’s 
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seventeenth century Spanish novel but written from the experience of Pierre 
Menard and attributed to him.  
 The great critical debate over Borges’s proposals regarding the relation of 
literary works to their texts and the success or failure of Pierre Menard’s project 
wages on, and though this issue certainly bears on my analysis of the story, I find 
myself agreeing with Jésus Aguilar’s admonition that to “assume that Borges was 
defending all the time the view that a work cannot be its text” is to “deliberately 
[read] into a piece of fiction a highly contentious ontological thesis” (174). I am 
interested less in debating whether or not it is possible for a text to exist 
independently of the work associated with it and more in how a text is 
transformed into a work, what motivates that transformation, who claims the 
work produced—or claims authority on it—and what the consequences of the act 
of creating and the act of laying claim are. Through Pierre Menard’s project and 
the narrator’s commentary on it, Borges parodies the author’s longing for the 
glorified status of creator as well as the impulse of authors and critics alike to 
seek legitimization within their cultural contexts. Simultaneously, Borges 
suggests that historical periods should be understood not only in terms of the 
literary texts which are produced during them, but in terms of what readers and 
critics of the period rely on to create a text’s meaning, and to what use they put 
the text in question. Developing this understanding is not merely a matter of 
interpretation and context, but of the status attributed to a text within a given 
community—and the effects of that status. 
  
Origins:  The Question of Authorship 
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 Much like Dante Alighieri, who insistently draws attention to his status as 
a poet throughout the Commedia but most especially in Canto VI of Inferno, 
when the virtuous pagan poets (or Poets) of Hell's first circle greet him as kin (ln. 
82-102), and whose text is marked by mimesis of Virgil's Aeneid, Borges is 
preoccupied with the role of the author in “Pierre Menard,” and his relationship 
to his predecessors. I say “the author,” not “himself as author,” in order to 
address the multifarious nature of authorship and construed authority in the 
piece: we have Miguel Cervantes, seventeenth century Spanish author of the 
Quixote; Pierre Menard, the twentieth century symbolist from Nîmes and would-
be author of the Quixote; Madame Henri Bachelier and others who have written 
about Pierre Menard; the narrator of the story, a contemporary of Menard’s who 
privileges himself above the late author’s other critics; and finally, Borges 
himself, the mastermind behind this short story masquerading as criticism. 
These voices intermingle and overlap even as they support and/or oppose one 
another’s claims to authoritative status.  
 Given the complexity of this structure—and of the theoretical framework 
of “Pierre Menard”—it will prove instructive to explore some of Borges’s thoughts 
on literary creation. In “Pierre Menard” and other writings, both fictional and 
nonfictional, Borges subverts the sacred idea of the individual author as the 
origin of literature. One of the ideas that Borges revisits in a number of writings is 
the concept of literary creation as an act of many minds united in one mind, or 
one mind which comprises many. Though he never fully endorses this idea, its 
recurrence in so many texts indicates his fascination with the idea of such a 
union’s possibilities—and limitations. “Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” the first story 
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in the collection that includes “Pierre Menard”1—explores the collaborative 
invention of an imaginary ideal world, existing at first only as text, which slowly 
imposes on and replaces the world we think of as reality. Borges as narrator tells 
us that, in trying to figure out who had invented Tlon, he and his associates 
"unanimously rejected the idea of a single creator;" rather, they conjecture that 
the world of Tlon has come into being through "the work of a secret society…all 
under this supervision of an unknown genius" following "a strict, systematic 
plan" that is "so vast that each individual contribution to it is infinitesimal" (22). 
In the lengthy explication of the systems of Tlon that follows—its philosophy, its 
language, its literature and mathematics—Borges tells of a Tlonian heresiarch 
who, "in the orthodox tradition, advanced a most daring hypothesis…[that] there 
is only one Individual, and that this indivisible Individual is every one of the 
separate beings in the universe" (27). In the same vein, "in Tlon the source of all-
knowing is single and eternal," and "the dominant [Tlonian] notion is that 
everything is the work of one single author…the concept of plagiarism does not 
exist; it has been established that all books are the work of one single writer, who 
is timeless and anonymous. Criticism is prone to invent authors" and "works of 
fiction are based on a single plot, which runs through every imaginable 
permutation” (28). The connection between an individual writer and his 
particular literary production is destroyed in Tlon, as is the idea of individual 
writers and works as distinct from one another. 
 Borges’s choice to place “Tlön” first in this collection is suggestive; many of 
the stories which follow “Tlön” pick up and elaborate on ideas, or aspects of ideas, 
                                                 
1
 The Garden of Forking Paths, Part One of Ficciones 
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contained in it. Considering Borges’s proclivity for the detective story, readers 
would do well to follow the leads given by the order in which Borges’s stories 
appear—but that is another essay for another day. For the purposes of this essay, 
let us begin by examining how “Pierre Menard” interacts with some the notions 
about authorship that Borges introduces in “Tlon.” The project itself—of a second 
mind which seeks “to produce pages which would coincide—word for word and 
line for line—with those of Miguel de Cervantes” (49), who died some 300 years 
before the birth of Menard, echoes the Tlonian doctrine of one mind which 
encompasses many, and of literary production as permutation. Even as Menard is 
attributing the Quixote to himself, he is conceptually detaching the individual 
author from the text he produces, thus leaving the text as it exists in and of itself 
unclaimed. If both he and Miguel de Cervantes can write the exact same text, 
who—or what—is in possession of it? How can two people have created the same 
thing? Menard considers the Quixote as a text independent from its original 
author, able to exist apart from him, thus subverting the image of the author as a 
creator and originator, even as—ironically—Menard claims the text for himself. 
 In making this claim, Menard reveals that he still thinks of the author in 
terms of what he or she has generated. Though he declares that, "Every man 
should be capable of all ideas, and I believe that in the future he will be" (54), 
espousing a philosophy and undertaking a project fit for the idealists of Tlon, 
“Menard seems to be drawing from two apparently contradictory sources of 
knowledge, pure creativity, as well as an archetypal realm where works of 
literature exist in potencia, that is, in their as-yet-to-be-created form” (Giskin 
110). Rather than being a second author of Don Quixote, Menard wants us to 
Strong 6 
believe that has rediscovered the text—just as Cervantes discovered it—in the 
Platonic realm of universal Forms, where it is “waiting to be created or discovered 
by another” (110).  By implying that has access to something which exists beyond 
our conception of the text as Cervantes’s possession, Menard attempts to account 
for his argument that the Quixote belongs to him just as it belongs to Cervantes. 
Menard asks readers to believe that he is not copying Cervantes’s text, but rather 
accessing the text that Cervantes accessed in the early seventeenth century. 
However, Menard’s desire to possess the Quixote reveals his preoccupation with 
what the attribution of a text to an author can do for that author. Not only does 
Menard claim that he has equal access to the potentiality of this text with the 
celebrated figure of Miguel de Cervantes—celebrated for having written the 
Quixote—but that he has an equal ability to realize that potentiality. He seeks to 
write Don Quixote word-for-word as Cervantes wrote it, and in so doing confer 
upon himself a status comparable with Cervantes’s. Though he deconstructs what 
Nadia Lie calls “the romantic notion of the author as source,” he still manages to 
endorse it in his desire to have written the Quixote out of his own experience. 
 The conflation of authorship in “Pierre Menard” lends itself to a 
biographical reading of the story, examining Borges himself in relation to Menard 
in relation to Cervantes. Borges posits in “A Profession of Literary Faith,” an 
essay written some thirteen years before “Menard,” that “all literature, in the end, 
is autobiographical” (67). Years later, he was also conceptualizing writing as 
rewriting, and experimenting with the idea that all works are ultimately a part of 
the same work (Alazraki 101-104). As Rosemary Arrojo points out, Borges opened 
his first collection of poems with the following:  “If the pages of this book happen 
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to contain any apt line, may the reader forgive me the discourtesy of having 
stolen it from you. […] The circumstances which make you the reader of these 
exercises and me their writer are trivial and fortuitous” (qtd. from Obra poética 
22; Arrojo’s translation). Unlike Menard, Borges is most fastidious about 
acknowledging that his writing was the rewriting of others’, remarking, 
“Everything I have written could be found in Poe, Stevenson, Wells, Chesterton, 
and some others” (qtd. in Alazraki 103). However, Borges, like his character, is 
drawn to Don Quixote; merely skimming a collection of his nonfiction will turn 
up a great number of references to it, and “Pierre Menard” makes use of the kind 
of panoply of authors that appears in the Quixote. Arrojo argues that Borges, with 
his proclivity for translating work he admires, like Walt Whitman’s Leaves of 
Grass, reveals his own Bloomian “anxiety of influence,” identifying himself with 
his artistic role models (in this case, Cervantes and Whitman) through acts of 
translation and transference. Admiration for an author and work evolve into 
wanting to be that author and to have created the work in question. Through 
translation, in Borges’s case, and reproduction, in Menard’s, an author might 
identify himself with an esteemed author by in some way laying claim to that 
author’s work, blurring the distinction between the reader of a work and its 
author—a distinction already blurred by the resonance of an author’s words with 
his/her reader. 
 Compared to Borges, Menard’s anxiety of influence results in a far more 
antagonistic relationship with his literary father, Cervantes. In actively seeking to 
write the Quixote, Menard not only conflates himself with Cervantes, but 
attempts to claim an even higher status than his predecessor for the production 
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of an identical text. He is not content to produce the Quixote in the same way that 
Cervantes did, though that is his first instinct: “to know Spanish well, to re-
embrace the Catholic faith, to fight against Moors and Turks, to forget European 
history between 1602 and 1918, and to be Miguel de Cervantes” (49). The 
narrator informs us that, though Menard was having some limited success with 
this procedure, he “rejected it as too easy…. To be, in the twentieth century, a 
popular novelist of the seventeenth seemed to him a diminution” (49) Rather, 
Menard believes that it would be more arduous—and therefore more 
interesting—“to continue being Pierre Menard and to arrive at Don Quixote 
through the experiences of Pierre Menard” (49). Further, we are told, “This 
conviction…forced him to exclude the autobiographical prologue of the second 
part of Don Quixote” which would “have meant presenting Don Quixote as the 
work of this personage and not of Menard” (49). In rejecting the method of total 
identification with an author as a means of producing that author’s text, Menard 
reveals his uneasiness about sharing this work with Cervantes, or seeming to 
have copied him. His admiration for Cervantes first translates into wanting to be 
Cervantes and to have what he has, then evolves into wanting to surpass him by 
doing the same thing he has done but with more “interesting,” complex results. 
The status of the text, and therefore its creator, will be heightened; the 
intellectual achievement will be greater under a writer with the work itself as a 
context because it will have to take that context, and “the three hundred years 
[that] have passed, charged with the most complex happenings,” into account in 
order to come to the same textual conclusion as Cervantes. It is vital to Menard’s 
project for the Quixote that he produces to be known unambiguously as his, 
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though he certainly expects readers to be aware of Cervantes’s novel and to use 
Cervantes’s work in interpreting and evaluating his own. Plausible 
interpretations of the Quixote are necessarily increased under Menard’s 
authorship not only because of the shift in historical period, but because the 
Quixote already exists as a point of comparison—and readings of the Quixote will 
forever after have to deal with the context and consequences of its repetition. 
 The question must now be asked:  is Menard’s Quixote separate from 
Cervantes’s? Jésus Aguilar, in [title of his article], asks the question more 
elegantly: “is Borges suggesting the existence of two works, one written by 
Cervantes and the other by Menard,” as critics tend to assume, “or only one work 
which has two authors” (173)?  Aguilar, for his part, argues that “Borges’s fiction 
is sufficiently ambiguous to permit a justified reading in which the whole 
challenge which Menard set himself consists in performing the incredible feat of 
writing again the only Don Quixote: ‘No…otro Quijote—lo cual es fácil—sino el 
Quijote2’” The italicization of the definite article seems to be what Aguilar is 
drawing attention to here, though he does not say so outright. This italicization 
places emphasis on the article as definite; that is to say, it emphasizes both the 
Quixote’s status and its singularity. There is only the Quixote; there is no other 
Quixote. The singularity of the text does not allow for the existence of an identical 
text that is not, in the end, itself—but, to Menard’s way of thinking, this 
singularity has no bearing on who can lay claim to the text. In order for him to 
attribute the text to himself, it was necessary for him to detach the author from 
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 The translation which I am using figures this as, “He did not want to compose another 
Don Quixote—which would be easy—but the Don Quixote” (48). 
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the linguistic event of the text; the author becomes a part of the work, the 
meaning of a piece of literature, rather than an intrinsic part of the text itself, in 
the reading process. 
 
Creative, Critical Reading 
 Reading, in Borges, is essential to the production of literary meaning—in 
elevating a text from a purely linguistic event to a work with significance and 
consequences. As Erick Felinto, writing about Borges’s theory of reading as it 
appears in “Pierre Menard,” explains 
the collaboration of the reader takes on more importance than that 
of the author, since it is the task of the former to realize the 
hermeneutic movement that leads to the actualization of the text… 
The meaning of the text does not preexist the hermeneutic act, but 
is constituted in the process itself. Each reader actualizes 
determined latent potentialities in the text (4, qtd. in Giskin 105). 
Because the reader is the one responsible for matching up sign with signified, 
then analyzing the connection or disparity between that which is directly signified 
by the text (its “latent potentialities”) and that which is indirectly signified 
through connotation, association, the structure and tone of the work, its 
relationship with other texts, any familiarity the reader might have with the 
author, etc., the reader is in no small way responsible for the impression of the 
work which he or she has formed by its end, and in this way is an indispensable 
participant in the process of literary creation. Each individual reader is involved 
in transforming preexisting texts into works, forming interpretations of them 
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which then exist, in each individual’s mind, as the actual literary work in 
question—and each individual’s impression of that work necessarily diverges 
from his fellows’, though commonalities occur. 
 Just as there are many authors in “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” 
so too are there many readers; in fact, all of the characters in “Pierre Menard,” in 
addition to Borges as a writer and the reader in the real world who sits with 
Borges’s text in front of him or her, can be considered readers in some sense. 
Gerard Genette’s Palimpsests, a work that takes its title from a passage in “Pierre 
Menard3,” helps to elucidate the way in which Borges’s stories are the progeny of 
both writing and reading: 
By attributing the invention of his stories to others, 
Borges…presents his writing as a reading; he disguises his writing 
as reading. The two procedures are, of course, complementary; they 
merge into a single metaphor of the complex and ambiguous 
relations between writing and reading. These relations…are most 
evidently the heart and soul of hypertextual activity (qtd. in 
Alazraki 108). 
The narrator, an anonymous commentator and friend of Menard’s, is, like 
Borges, a peculiar kind of reader who crosses over between reading and writing:  
the narrator is a critic, whose role in constructing Menard as an author is, as 
Nadia Lie argues, crucial, and who—perhaps more importantly—acts as a guide to 
other readers. The critic is a public reader with the potential to influence the 
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 “I have thought that it is legitimate to consider the “final” Don Quixote as a kind of palimpsest, in which 
should appear traces—tenuous but not indecipherable—of the ‘previous’ handwriting of our friend” (54). 
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readings of others, but, like an author of fiction, in order to be convincing, the 
critic must win his or her readers’ trust.  
 From the first page of “Pierre Menard,” the narrator is preoccupied with 
legitimizing himself as a critic, attempting to justify the privileged position he has 
taken in commemorating Pierre Menard and commenting on the late author’s 
intellectual endeavors. In order to confer legitimacy on himself, he must also 
ensure that Menard’s status as the author of the Quixote is legitimate; in order to 
endorse the text that he is reading publicly, its originality—that is to say, its 
having been created, not copied, by the author to whom it is attributed—must be 
established. Menard’s legitimacy, and that of his work, bears on the legitimacy of 
his anonymous critic.  At the risk of being too reductive, to confer legitimacy 
upon an author and his/her text is to orient them within a given context, 
determining their status both with relation to the works and authors which 
precede and inform their work and with regards to the cultural context out of 
which they are written, to borrow Daniel Balderson’s deliberate misreading of the 
phrase “out of context” in the title of his book investigating the historicity of 
Borges’s highly allusive writings (15). The processes through which this 
legitimization takes place are essentially performative, aimed at conferring a 
tenuously constructed—but, to the narrator, highly regarded—value upon a text 
and its perceived creator. 
 In the second paragraph of “Pierre Menard,” the narrator, who 
acknowledges that “it would be very easy to challenge [his] meager authority,” 
calls upon the approbation of two of his aristocratic connections, the Baroness de 
Bacourt and the Countess de Bagnoregio, in order to justify his rectification of the 
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Error which is “trying to tarnish [Menard’s] Memory” (45). Not only does the 
paragraph detailing the authorizations of the Baroness and Countess call 
attention to the narrator and Menard’s aristocratic connections, thus heightening 
their social status by association, but this paragraph also points to the 
aristocracy’s role as the gatekeepers of cultural convention, the mechanism by 
which works of literature are praised or censured. In aligning himself with the 
social class which seems to determine the legitimacy of intellectual and artistic 
enterprise, the narrator attempts to confer upon himself an authoritative 
intellectual status. 
 Though the narrator assumes that his claim to authority through an 
alignment with the institutions which appear to dictate the value of a given work 
or author is successful, such may not be the case. Jorge Gracia refers to the 
phenomenon of institutions as determiners of the particular qualities defining a 
work as the institutional view, an interpretive mechanism which “leads to a 
vicious circle or an infinite regress” (89). Because it does not identify what 
features, exactly, confer a high or low status upon a given work, the institutional 
view is imprecise, unpredictable, and highly contingent upon the preferences of a 
certain class of individuals rather than attempting to demarcate what qualities 
make a work deserving of praise. Thus, the narrator’s attempt to legitimize his 
authority through an identification of himself with the aristocracy does not 
succeed; rather, in even making such an attempt, the narrator subverts his 
“meager authority” because he draws attention to his own fallacious conviction 
that the approval of the upper classes bestows value and high status upon a 
writer. 
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 The passage in which the narrator attempts to corroborate his authority by 
appropriating aristocratic support comes after a paragraph in which the narrator 
attacks Madame Henri Bachelier, who has apparently published a “fallacious 
catalogue” of Menard’s “visible works” in a newspaper with “Protestant 
tendencies [which] are no secret,” and readers who are “few and Calvinist, if not 
Masonic and circumcised” (45). The narrator seems to be attempting 
legitimization here as well. His invective against Mme Bachelier and the readers 
of the newspaper that has published her catalogue effectively sets up an 
opposition between the veracity of his work and the falsity of the lady’s, 
compounded by her—to the narrator—dubious readers. However, the narrator’s 
diatribe rather unequivocally suggests that the narrator has an unapologetically 
Catholic bias. That the narrator’s bias is Catholic is not particularly relevant to 
my argument, but the evincing of a clear bias taints the narrator’s account for the 
rest of the story. Since he has made clear that he is capable both of bias for his 
aristocratic connections and against both Madame Bachelier and non-Catholics, 
the narrator’s capacity for prejudice must be taken into account in evaluating his 
legitimacy as an author. If the narrator is not impartial, then his qualitative 
analysis of Pierre Menard’s work is necessarily dubious. His arguments are 
suspect because there is a possibility that they are not objective or even trying to 
be objective. 
 The narrator later attacks Mme Bachelier for listing “a literal translation of 
a literal translation done by Quevedo of the Introduction à la vie devote of Saint 
Francis of Sales,” remarking that “in Pierre Menard’s library there are no traces 
of such a work” and insisting that “she must have misunderstood a remark of his 
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which he had intended as a joke” (47). Ironically, the narrator confesses to having 
omitted one of Pierre Menard’s visible works from the list:  “some vague, 
circumstantial sonnets for the hospitable, or greedy, album of Madame Henri 
Bachelier” (48). This is yet another example of his antagonism with Mme 
Bachelier and an attempt to set himself up as an authority in comparison with 
her, an attempt which, due to the inadequacies the narrator’s own words reveal, 
is quite unsuccessful. Even more tellingly, the narrator counts the Quixote, of 
which he admits there are no traces of in Menard’s library, as not only one of 
Menard’s achievements, but as his most monumental. By saying that Madame 
Bachelier has misunderstood a joke of Menard’s but assuming that he himself has 
not misunderstood Menard’s undertaking of the Quixote—and taking into 
account that Menard has a tendency to say exactly the opposite of what he means 
(cf. invective against Valéry in the catalogue)—the narrator inadvertently points 
to his own vulnerability as an interpreter. How can we, as readers, trust what he 
has to say if he censures others for a supposed misunderstanding when there is a 
possibility that he himself has misunderstood Menard’s project? This passage 
casts doubt on whether or not Menard even undertook the Don Quixote project; 
ironic, since the narrator promotes Menard’s undertaking as a colossal feat. 
 The narrator is careful to inform us of Menard’s other writings—or at least 
the ones he feels are important to his reading of Menard. The catalogue listing 
Menard’s “visible work”—a traditional feature of the kind of literary eulogy the 
narrator presents—functions within the story both as the narrator’s attempt to 
enhance his reader’s sense of his privileged position and as an attempt to 
establish Menard as a prolific writer—a move towards making Menard’s Quixotic 
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undertaking acceptable within the community for which he is writing. However, 
Borges, in “An Investigation of the Word,” reproaches the impulse to construe 
such a list as authoritative, insisting that “summaries add a false categorical and 
definitive air to whatever they condense” (27).  The act of listing and glossing 
Menard’s visible works, then, speaks less powerfully than the items themselves. 
In fact, the articles and other writings which comprise the catalogue of Pierre 
Menard’s visible work subverts Menard’s reliability as an author, thus 
counteracting the narrator’s claim to legitimacy for them both on these grounds. 
  The use of dates in this catalogue of Pierre Menard’s visible work (46-47), 
a feature which might ordinarily be overlooked, contributes to the narrator’s 
attempt to legitimize Menard’s status as an author.  Borges even says, in “The 
Detective Story,” “I am weak on dates,” indicating that dates themselves are, in 
comparison with the larger aspects of establishing a historical context for a piece, 
very paltry devices indeed. The fussy dating in the catalogue, traditional for such 
a list, can here be read as an alignment of content with historical truth through 
chronological ordering—that is to say, a publication looks more legitimate with a 
date attached to it, whether or not the publication does indeed exist. Since the 
narrator is obsessed with proving his own legitimacy, and considering his 
insistence on the existence of a work which he cannot prove actually existed, this 
stratagem is ineffective and only heightens the irony of the piece. The irony is 
intensified further when the narrator muses on Menard’s view of historical 
truth—“not what took place, [but] what we think took place” (53), thus indicating 
that historical truth is not objective and that, indeed, it does not necessarily exist. 
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 In Section e of the catalogue, concerning a piece Menard wrote on the 
possibility of changing a rule of chess, Menard “proposes, recommends, disputes, 
and ends by rejecting this innovation” (46). This article shows the process of 
Menard’s efforts rather than just the end result, unlike the Don Quixote project, 
in which Menard destroys all evidence of his process (49). The article on chess 
draws a distinction between literary work and the workings of philosophy, in 
which, as Gracia explains, the process of creating an idea must be explicated 
(100). Menard inverts the purpose of philosophical processes in the article on 
chess; rather than supporting his proposal through logic, Menard ultimately 
disproves its value and rejects the proposal he himself put forward, rendering the 
article a parody of philosophy and Menard a parody of a philosopher. Though 
Menard isn’t saying the opposite of what he means, he is talking himself out of 
what he means. Menard undercuts his own argument, and in doing so, essentially 
undercuts all his arguments because he casts doubt on his own legitimacy as an 
author. 
 Section p describes an invective Menard wrote against Paul Valéry, and the 
narrator comments parenthetically that it “is the exact reverse of his true opinion 
of Valéry,” and that “the latter understood it as such” (47). Here, too, there is a 
contradiction, this time between what is said and what is meant as opposed to 
what is said in the beginning and what is said in the end. This invective is, in fact, 
a panegyric, if we are meant to understand that praise is the opposite of censure 
and interpret the work thus. Rather than creating meaning using the 
conventional meanings of words, Menard creates meaning through opposition in 
this piece. In expressing the exact opposite of what he means, Menard inverts the 
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semantic ordering of language, proposing a model of reading based on antonymy 
rather than synonymy and pointing to the arbitrary nature of language in that a 
given word could just as easily mean the opposite of what we perceive it to mean 
based on the conventions of the particular language in which it is used. This 
model differentiates further between what the author creates and what the reader 
creates in literature. Because it insists on a different system of significance for 
words, the separation between sign and signified—between text and work—is 
enlarged. More context, in this case about the semantic system the author has 
chosen to use, is needed in order to evaluate the author’s intentions in writing a 
given piece. The author reads his work differently than would a reader unfamiliar 
with the author’s unexpressed intentions. 
 The privileged position the narrator holds with regards to Menard further 
distances him from Menard’s other readers and heightens his claims to a superior 
reading of Menard’s life and writings. In asserting the objectivity of his catalogue 
over Madame Bachelier’s, in extensively quoting from Menard’s letters, and in 
claiming to have a wealth of personal knowledge about him, the narrator wants 
his readers to believe that he has obtained “an inside view of another character,” 
and in believing that he is so privileged, to give great credence to his rhetorical 
powers, and have “absolute faith in his powers of divination” (Booth 160). If the 
reader caves to the narrator’s demands for this faith, he or she will be forced to 
trust the narrator’s commentary (214), and thus to accept his reading of Menard’s 
work on the grounds that he is more knowledgeable than someone with less 
firsthand—or is it secondhand?—knowledge about the great author’s intentions. 
The narrator privileges his reading of Menard based on the assumption that he 
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has correctly interpreted everything Menard has told him, and that, in 
interpreting a literary text, the author’s intentions should be privileged above 
other means of evaluation. However, Menard, as the narrator acknowledges, 
remarking upon Menard’s “resigned or ironic habit of propounding ideas which 
were the strict reverse of those he preferred” (52), has a habit of saying things 
that are the opposite of what he means. Without knowing the intention behind 
the expressed intention, it is impossible for the attentive reader to wholly trust 
the narrator, who has ironically revealed his unreliability—even as he explicitly 
seeks to convince us that he is reliable. 
 Though the creative role of the reader in Borges is affirmed, the infallibility 
of the reader is firmly denied. The narrator, a privileged reader and critic, has 
been laid open for the reader of Borges’s text. His agenda, as well as his errors, 
prejudices, and assumptions, are embedded in the text, though one must read 
attentively to unearth them. However, once the reader has spotted and evaluated 
the narrator’s vulnerabilities, the reader must evaluate his or her own reading, 
and might be forced to confront the errors, prejudices, and assumptions that 
influenced his or her interpretation of the text. “Pierre Menard” is not only 
metafiction, but metareading. Just as metafictional writings “reject the 
traditional figure of the author as a transcendental imagination 
fabricating…structures of order which will replace the forgotten material text of 
the world” and reveal the “author” as “a concept produced through previous and 
existing literary and social texts” (Waugh 16) , Borges’s metareading rejects the 
reader as a transcendental source of meaning, revealing that the reader is also 
constructed, a product of his or her particular social, intellectual, cultural, and 
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historical context as well as his or her own personal motivations, antagonisms, 
and proclivities. However, the rejection of the reader and author as 
transcendental sources of meaning does not wholly nullify the power of either to 
create meaning—it merely cautions us against giving too much credence to any 
interpretation of a work as objective, including the author’s and our own. 
 
Reading Into History 
 Though no interpretation of a work can achieve objectivity, that is not to 
say that criticism has no value. The narrator may lament that 
There is no intellectual exercise which is not ultimately useless. A 
philosophical doctrine is in the beginning a seemingly true 
description of the universe; as the years pass it becomes a mere 
chapter—if not a paragraph or noun—in the history of philosophy. 
In literature, this ultimate decay is even more notorious” (53), 
but this is not necessarily so. Criticism will never produce irrefutable results, and 
the shifting, subjective traditions of literature that arise in each new age 
inevitably bring about a reevaluation of old texts and ideas in comparison with 
new ones, but to say that this reevaluation leads to an “ultimate decay,” and that 
intellection is “ultimately useless,” is to sound the doomsday trumpet without 
cause. A text which seems to decay under one theoretical regime might be 
rediscovered and reinvigorated when the next generation of thinkers becomes 
influential. Not only that, but interpretations, especially of major texts like the 
Quixote, have consequences that are not always strictly intellectual. 
 History is defined not only in terms of the literary works that are produced 
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during a particular period, but the way in which works are made and received. In 
“Pierre Menard,” Borges proposes that the history of interpretation and use of 
specific works literature should bear on the way we examine a period. In some 
ways, we already regard history in this way, but our idea of intellectual history 
generally depends more on who was writing what during a given period and what 
the broader theory of the age looked like, and less on how a particular reading of 
a particular text might help us understand the readers of the age instead of trying 
so hard to understand the writers. Are there scholars of literature who study the 
reception of the Quixote in certain ages? Likely, yes, but are there historians who 
study an age in terms of how it responded to and made use of major texts—texts 
that, like the Quixote, have come to be regarded as Ur-texts—outside of literature, 
philosophy, and theory? I have never encountered such a study, though 
medievalists come very close in their studies of the appropriation of classics like 
the Aeneid during the Middle Ages, but “Pierre Menard” suggests that this kind of 
historicism might be worth exploring. 
 A far more macroscopic project would be required in order to investigate 
and evaluate any proposal for a new historiography, but let us examine the 
function of historical context, of which tradition is a part, in “Pierre Menard.” The 
much-studied passage in which the narrator quotes two identical passages of the 
Quixote, one which is attributed to Cervantes and the other to Menard, not only 
raises the question raised by the story as a whole—whether or not it is possible for 
the same text to be attributed to two different authors—but also engages with the 
issue of tradition’s interpretive influence and the function of history. The 
narrator’s first iteration of the passage names Menard as its author: 
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…truth, whose mother is history, who is the rival of time, 
depository of deeds, witness of the past, example and lesson to the 
present, and warning to the future. 
 
Written in the seventeenth century, written by the “ingenious 
layman” Cervantes, this enumeration is a mere rhetorical eulogy of 
history (53). 
The narrator goes on to quote the same passage from Part One, Chapter Nine of 
the Quixote, but this time attributes it to Menard, marveling at the idea that “a 
contemporary of William James does not define history as an investigation of 
reality, but as its origin. Historical truth, for him, is not what took place; it is 
what we think took place” (53). The narrator’s interpretation of the passage is 
immediately dependent on the intellectual context in which it was created and 
the interpretive conventions—let us call them traditions—of the historical period 
in which each ostensible author is located. For Cervantes, who predates 
pragmatism, to call history the mother of truth was, according to the narrator’s 
reading, nothing but a grandiose flourish of language whose purpose does not 
extend beyond the stylistic. The narrator credits Menard, on the other hand, with 
being “shamelessly pragmatic,” reading into Pierre Menard’s status as a 
contemporary of William James4 in interpreting this passage. Context, here, is 
the key to differentiation, and allows for the same words to be read as though 
they were authored by two different people. Tradition’s capacity to create 
                                                 
4
 Balderson discusses “Pierre Menard’s” connection to pragmatism and other 
philosophical and literary systems in the second chapter of Out of Context. 
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meaning is thus foregrounded. The narrator’s insistence upon reading the 
passage based on its perceived context points to the way tradition has morphed 
from the seventeenth century to the twentieth and endorses the idea—one voiced 
by the narrator, but which Borges seems to endorse rather than subvert—that 
“ambiguity is a richness” (53). That a text has multiple possibilities for meaning 
does not necessarily weaken it; rather, in the multifarious readings that readers 
can made of a text, the flexibility of language, the diversity of intellection, and, 
ultimately, the tremendous capacity of the human mind are celebrated. 
 This act of interpretation based on the traditions of two different historical 
periods champions the richness of ambiguity, and the position Borges, in this 
passage, takes with regards to tradition as an interpretive mechanism is certainly 
ambiguous. Critics have broached arguments on both sides of the issue, but the 
most striking arguments have in common an interest in the effects of the new 
Quixote and its interpretations on the work of the original, looking both at the 
text as Menard’s and the work as a product of Menard’s historical context. In one 
passage of “Pierre Menard,” the narrator construes the whole Quixote as having 
been written by Menard rather than simply the fragments he claimed to have 
produced. The narrator leans close and says, 
Shall I confess that I often imagine that he [Menard] finished it and 
that I am reading Don Quixote—the entire work—as if Menard had 
conceived it? Several nights ago, while leafing through Chapter 
XXVI—which he had never attempted—I recognized our friend’s 
style and, as it were, his voice in this exceptional phrase:  the 
nymphs of the rivers, mournful and humid Echo.  This effective 
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combination of two adjectives, one moral and the other physical, 
reminded me of a line from Shakespeare which we discussed one 
afternoon….” (50). 
As Nadia Lie proposes in “Who is the Reader of Pierre Menard?” in this passage, 
the narrator inverts the chronological influence of the works; the narrator “ends 
up looking at the more recent work as the ‘original,’ the ‘influence’ being 
construed ex post facto” (94). Reading in this way, Lie argues, “presents 
Cervantes’s text as ‘secondary’ to Menard’s on an axiological level:  the French 
writer’s text is considered both incomparably more complex and subtle than 
Cervantes’s” (92). Indeed, the narrator makes these very claims, referring to 
Menard’s text as “more subtle” (51) and “almost infinitely richer” than 
Cervantes’s. The later text, in being so far removed in time and space from its 
setting, and in having been potentially influenced by 300 more years’ worth of 
“the most complex happenings”—including the original text—seems, to the 
narrator, more of an achievement than Cervantes’s Quixote, which becomes a 
shade of Menard’s. 
 The idea that a text might be exerted ex post facto brings to mind another 
passage from “Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” describing a curious object, called a 
hronir, which is a repetition of another object: 
In the very oldest regions of Tlon, it is not an uncommon 
occurrence for lost objects to be duplicated. Two people are looking 
for a pencil; the first one finds it and says nothing; the second finds 
a second pencil, no less real, but more in keeping with his 
expectation. These secondary objects are called hronir, and, even 
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though awkward in form, are a little larger than the originals (29). 
The hrönir have allowed Tlon's past to be questioned and even modified; Tlon's 
past, Borges tells us, "is no less malleable or obedient than [its] future" (30). 
Menard’s Don Quixote is in some ways a hronir of Cervantes’s; it is a duplication, 
a secondary object which is “a little larger” than the original in that more has 
influenced it; whose style is a bit more awkward—the narrator calls Menard’s 
handling of 17th century Spanish “affected” in comparison to Cervantes’s easy 
handling of his native tongue (53)—but which changes the past as it exists in the 
mind of the reader. This idea can also be found in T.S. Eliot’s influential 1919 
essay, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in which Eliot explores the 
connection between the artist and the works which have preceded the artist. Eliot 
claims that an author must recognize that he/she is engaging with a rich 
inherited tradition, one that bears on the reader’s understanding of new work, 
and that any new art will alter the audience’s conception of preexisting works. 
 Eliot’s essay also suggests that literary tradition serves an important 
evaluative function. In supplying other texts as points of comparison and 
building certain frameworks of meaning—the literary systems and categories into 
which texts fall—literary tradition provides interpretive patterns for the 
interaction of a piece’s form and content.  Since this essay appeared 20 years 
before Borges wrote and published “Pierre Menard,” the likelihood that Borges 
was engaging with it to some extent in this story is high. However, critics disagree 
about the conclusions to which Borges comes on tradition. José Venegas, writing 
on Borges’s engagement with Eliot’s theory of tradition, maintains that “Menard’s 
(re)writing of Cervantes’s novel forcefully undermines the very idea of tradition 
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as meaning-production” (240), and that, in “Menard,” Borges seeks to counteract 
the influence of tradition. On the other hand, Daniel Cottom, writing about 
tradition in Borges more broadly, proclaims that “art departs from and yet still 
must recall baffling tradition, which is a miracle in disguise, forever threatening 
even as it looks after us” (11) and that “no matter how the past may be imaged, 
and even if it is made out to be absolutely surpassed, tradition is inextricable 
from the act of representation. That is why we cannot stop learning how to do 
things with tradition—even, and especially, when what we are doing is denying it” 
(7). 
 Cottom’s point that tradition is at once a guide and a threat, and that in 
denying it, we are still making use of it, aligns most closely with my own reading 
of Borges’s implicit commentary on tradition. Tradition cannot wholly be denied, 
because the act of denying it illuminates its power. However, that should not stop 
us from evaluating it—especially when tradition begins to create a work whose 
significance has more to do with the status of a text than with its content. When a 
person or group of people who have not read and analyzed the text—non-readers, 
in both the sense that they have not read the actual text and that they have not 
created a meaning for it based on that reading—make use of a text without having 
come to an individual understanding of it. The narrator of “Pierre Menard” 
relates Menard’s frustration with this kind of non-reading: 
“Don Quixote,” Menard once told me, “was above all an agreeable 
book; now it is an occasion for patriotic toasts, grammatical 
arrogance, and obscene deluxe editions. Glory is an 
incomprehension, and perhaps the worst” (53). 
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Though tradition, when applied critically by the reader, can and does produce 
meaning, which Borges illustrates in the “history, mother of truth” passage, 
tradition that elevates a text without analyzing it is unproductive and potentially 
dangerous. Whether or not a person understands a text, be it Don Quixote, a 
religious text, or a government document, that person’s beliefs concerning the 
text—and the actions spurred by those beliefs—can have real consequences for 
both individuals and the societies of which they are a part. 
 In acts of reading as in acts of writing, we reveal our own agendas, our 
frailties, the conventions of the day and age of which we are a part, even as we try 
to make things new. As we read, not only do we collaborate with the author in 
constructing the meaning of a piece of literature, but we decide what the 
consequences of a work are—the use to which it can be put, its relevance to us, 
and its importance on any number of levels.  As Evan Watkins remarks in The 
Critical Act, any time the reader, and especially the critic, makes a value 
judgment about a literary work, “the critic also allows the [work] to judge him,” 
and “genuine critical value judgments thus become reciprocal” (217). If historical 
truth is, as the narrator of “Pierre Menard” believes Menard to have implied,  
 “not what took place” but “what we think took place,” then our readings and our 
critical writings are not arbitrary or meaningless. In the Prologue to The Garden 
of Forking Paths, Borges informs us that “the list of writings that I attribute to 
[Menard] is not too amusing but neither is it arbitrary; it constitutes a diagram of 
his mental history….” (15). Just as the works of Pierre Menard the reader are a 
diagram of his mental history, so too are our readings—and the use to which we 
put them—collectively a diagram of our culture’s history, mental and otherwise. 
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